Will 2023 be hydrogen’s year?

GUEST COLUMN

Scott Nyquist debates both sides of the hydrogen argument in this week’s ECHTX Voices of Energy guest column. Photo courtesy of Aramco.

Yes and no.

Yes, because there is real money, and action, behind it.

Globally, there are 600 projects on the books to build electrolyzers, which separate the oxygen and hydrogen in water, and are critical to creating low-emissions “green hydrogen.” That investment could drive down the cost of low-emissions hydrogen, making it cost competitive with conventional fuels—a major obstacle to its development so far.

In addition, oil companies are interested, too. The industry already uses hydrogen for refining; many see hydrogen as supplemental to their existing operations and perhaps, eventually, supplanting them. In the meantime, it helps them to decarbonize their refining and petrochemical operations, which most of the majors have committed to doing.

Indeed, hydrocarbon-based companies and economies could have a big opportunity in “blue hydrogen,” which uses fossil fuels for production, but then captures and stores emissions. (“Green hydrogen” uses renewables; because it is expensive to produce, it is more distant than blue. “Gray hydrogen” uses fossil fuels, without carbon capture; this accounts for most current production and use.) Oil and gas companies have a head start on related infrastructure, such as pipelines and carbon capture, and also see new business opportunities, such as low-carbon ammonia.

Houston, for example, which likes to call itself the "energy capital of the world,” is going big on hydrogen. The region is well suited to this. It has an extensive pipeline infrastructure, an excellent port system, a pro-business culture, and experience. The Greater Houston Partnership and McKinsey—both of whom I am associated with—estimate that demand for hydrogen will grow 6 to 8 percent a year from 2030 to 2050. No wonder Houston wants a piece of that action.

There are promising, near-term applications for hydrogen, such as ammonia, cement, and steel production, shipping, long-term energy storage, long-haul trucking, and aviation. These bits and pieces add up: steel alone accounts for about 8 percent of global carbon-dioxide emissions. Late last year, Airbus announced it is developing a hydrogen-powered fuel cell engine as part of its effort to build zero-emission aircraft. And Cummins, a US-based engine company, is investing serious money in hydrogen for trains and commercial and industrial vehicles, where batteries are less effective; it already has more than 500 electrolyzers at work.

Then there is recent US legislation. The Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) of 2021 allocated $9.5 billion funding for hydrogen. Much more important, though, was last year’s Inflation Reduction Act, which contains generous tax credits to promote hydrogen production. The idea is to narrow the price gap between clean hydrogen and other, more emissions-intensive technologies; in effect, the law seeks to fundamentally change the economics of hydrogen and could be a true game-changer.

This is not without controversy: some Europeans think this money constitutes subsidies that are not allowed under trade rules. For its part, Europe has the hydrogen bug, too. Its REPowerEU plan is based on the idea of “hydrogen-ready infrastructure,” so that natural gas projects can be converted to hydrogen when the technology and economics make sense.

So there is a lot of momentum behind hydrogen, bolstered by the ambitious goals agreed to at the most recent climate conference in Egypt. McKinsey estimates that hydrogen demand could reach 660 million tons by 2050, which could abate 20 percent of total emissions. Total planned production for lower-emission green and blue hydrogen through 2030 has reached more than 26 million metric tons annually—quadruple that of 2020.

No, because major issues have not been figured out.

The plans in the works, while ambitious, are murky. A European official, asked about the REPowerEU strategy, admitted that “it’s not clear how it will work.” The same can be said of the United States. The hydrogen value chain, particularly for green hydrogen, requires a lot of electricity, and that calls for flexible grids and much greater capacity. For the United States to reach its climate goals, the grid needs to grow an estimated 60 percent by 2030.That is not easy: just try siting new transmission lines and watch the NIMBY monsters emerge.

Permitting can be a nightmare, often requiring separate approvals from local, state, interstate, and federal authorities, and from different authorities for each (air, land, water, endangered species, and on and on); money does not solve this. Even a state like Texas, which isn’t allergic to fossil fuels and has a relatively light regulatory touch, can get stuck in permitting limbo. Bill Gates recently noted that “over 1,000 gigawatts worth of potential clean energy projects [in the United States] are waiting for approval—about the current size of the entire U.S. grid—and the primary reason for the bottleneck is the lack of transmission.”

Then there is the matter of moving hydrogen from production site to market. Pipeline networks are not yet in place and shifting natural gas pipelines to hydrogen is a long way off. Liquifying hydrogen and transporting is expensive. In general, because hydrogen is still a new industry, it faces “chicken or egg” problems that are typical of the difficulties big innovations face, such as connecting hydrogen buyers to hydrogen producers and connecting carbon emitters to places to store the carbon dioxide. These challenges add to the complexity of getting projects financed.

Finally, there is money. McKinsey estimates that getting on track to that 600 million tons would require investment of $950 billion by 2030; so far, $240 billion has been announced.

Where I stand: in the middle.

I believe in hydrogen’s potential. More than 3 years ago, I wrote about hydrogen, arguing that while there had been real progress, “many things need to happen, in terms of policy, finance, and infrastructure, before it becomes even a medium-sized deal.” Now, some of those things are happening.

So, I guess I land somewhere in the middle. I think 2023 will see real progress, in decarbonizing refining and petrochemicals operations and producing ammonia, specifically. I am also optimistic that a number of low-emissions electrolysis projects will move ahead. And while such advances might seem less than transformative, they are critical: hydrogen, whether blue or green, needs to prove itself, and 2023 could be the year it does.

Because I take hydrogen’s potential seriously, though, I also see the barriers. If it is to become the big deal its supporters believe it could be, that requires big money, strong engineering and construction project management, sustained commitment, and community support. It’s easy to proclaim the wonders of the hydrogen economy; it’s much more difficult to devise sensible business models, standardized contracts, consistent incentives, and a regulatory system that doesn’t drive producers crazy. But all this matters—a lot.

My conclusion: there will be significant steps forward in 2023—but take-off is still years away.

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Scott Nyquist is a senior advisor at McKinsey & Company and vice chairman, Houston Energy Transition Initiative of the Greater Houston Partnership. The views expressed herein are Nyquist's own and not those of McKinsey & Company or of the Greater Houston Partnership. This article originally ran on LinkedIn.

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Houston investment firm closes $105M energy venture fund

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Houston-based investment firm Veriten has announced the initial close of its second flagship energy venture fund with more than $105 million in capital commitments.

Fund II will build on Veriten’s initial fund and aim to support “scalable technology solutions for energy, power and industrial applications,” according to a company news release.

"Our differentiated network, research-driven process, and first principles approach to investing are having an impact across multiple verticals including traditional energy, electrification, and industrial technology. Fund II builds on that platform,” John Sommers, partner, investments at Veriten, added in the release. “In this environment, the differentiator isn't capital – it's all about connectivity, deep sector expertise, and an economically-driven approach. As new technologies and approaches develop at breakneck speed, the need for more reliable, affordable energy and power continues to grow dramatically. The current backdrop accentuates the need for Veriten's solution."

Veriten is supported by over 50 strategic partnerships in the energy, power, industrial and technology sectors, including major players like Halliburton and Phillips 66.

"Veriten continues to build a differentiated platform at the intersection of energy, technology and industry expertise," Jeff Miller, chairman and CEO of Halliburton, said in the release. "We were early believers in the team and their ability to identify practical solutions to real challenges across the energy value chain. As all industries increasingly adopt digital tools, automation and AI-enabled technologies to improve performance and execution, we are proud to partner with Veriten again to help accelerate high-impact solutions across the broader energy landscape."

Veriten closed its debut fund, NexTen LP, of $85 million in committed capital in October 2023. It was launched in January 2022 by Maynard Holt, co-founder and former CEO of the energy investment bank Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co.

It has invested in Houston-based AI-powered electricity analytics provider Amperon and led a $12 million Seed 2 funding round for Houston-based Helix Technologies to scale manufacturing of its energy-efficient commercial HVAC add-on earlier this year. In the past year it has contributed to funding rounds for San Francisco-based Armada and Calgary-based Veerum.

Veriten also named Nick Morriss as its new managing director earlier this month. Morriss most recently served as vice president of business development at next-generation nuclear technology company Natura Resources and spent nearly 20 years at NOV Inc.

Houston energy expert asks: Who pays when AI outruns the power grid?

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For most of the past 20 years, U.S. electricity policy relied on predictable trends in demand. Electricity use, in most regions, increased gradually, forecasts were stable, and utilities adjusted the system in small steps. Power plants, transmission lines, and substations were generally added to reflect shifts in load, rather than growth, and costs were recovered through modest adjustments to customer bills.

Growth in AI data centers has disrupted this model. A single facility can add as much electricity demand as a small town. That demand comes all at once, runs continuously, and has little tolerance for outages. If electricity service drops even briefly, computation stops, and services shut down. Ironically, data centers need reliable service, a point that their emergence is driving concern around for the rest of the grid.

What the numbers say

The International Energy Agency projects global electricity consumption from data centers to double by 2030, reaching roughly 945 TWh, nearly 3 percent of global electricity demand, with consumption growing about 15 percent per year this decade. McKinsey projects that U.S. data center demand alone could grow 20–25 percent per year, with global capacity demand more than tripling by 2030.

After years of roughly 0.5 percent annual demand growth, many forecasts now place total U.S. electricity demand growth closer to 2–3 percent per year through the mid-2030s, with much higher growth in specific regions. In Texas, some forecasters are saying electricity demand could double over the next five years, a staggering 10 percent per year growth rate. What sounds incremental on paper translates into a major challenge on the ground. Meeting this pace of growth is estimated to require $250–$300 billion per year in grid investment, about double what the system has been absorbing.

Where the system starts to strain

The strain appears first in the interconnection queue. It shows up as long waits, backlogs, and delays for connecting new loads and new generation.

Before new generators or large load customers can be connected, a study is required to assess their impact on the grid, whether it can physically handle the added load, and whether upgrades are required. With AI-driven data centers, utilities face far more connection requests than they can realistically support. In ERCOT, large-load interconnection requests exceed 200 gigawatts, most tied to data centers. That amount exceeds historical norms, and it is several times larger than what can be practically studied or built in the near term.

To be clear, public utility commissions are required to study these requests because they must manage system capabilities to ensure minimal disruption. This means engineers spend time evaluating projects that may never be built, while other more commercially viable projects may wait longer for approvals. This extends timelines and makes infrastructure planning less reliable.

Why policymakers are rethinking the rules

Utilities and their regulators must decide how much generation, transmission, and substation capacity to build years before it comes online. Those decisions are based on expected demand at the time projects are approved. When it comes to data centers, by the time infrastructure is completed, they may end up deploying newer, more efficient chips that use less power than originally assumed. This can result in grid infrastructure built for a higher load than what actually materializes, leaving excess capacity that still must be paid for through system-wide rates.

That’s the central dilemma. If utilities build too little capacity, the system operates with less reserve margin. During periods of grid stress, operators have fewer options, increasing the likelihood of curtailments or outages. However, if utilities build too much, customers may be asked to pay for infrastructure that is not fully used.

In response, policymakers are adjusting the rules. In some regions, regulators are moving toward bring-your-own-power approaches that require large data centers to supply or fund part of the capacity needed to serve them or reduce demand during system stress. At the federal level, permitting reforms tied to datacenter infrastructure increasingly treat electricity as a strategic economic input.

As Ken Medlock, senior director at the Baker Institute Center for Energy Studies (CES), explains:

“Many of the planned data centers are now also adding behind-the-meter options to their development plans because they do not anticipate being able to manage their needs solely from the grid, and they certainly cannot do so with only intermittent power sources.”

Behind-the-meter (BTM) refers to power that a consumer controls on its side of the utility meter, such as on-site gas generation or a dedicated power plant. These resources allow data centers to keep operating during grid-related service. Most facilities remain connected to the grid, but the backup BTM generation serves as insurance for operating their core business.

This shifts responsibility. Utilities traditionally manage reliability across all customers by maintaining an operating reserve margin, or spare capacity. Increasingly, large-load customers manage part of their own electricity reliability needs, which changes how infrastructure is planned and how risk is distributed.

Bottom line

AI-driven load growth is arriving faster and in more concentrated places than the power system was built to accommodate. Utilities and regulators are being forced to make decisions sooner than planned about where to build, how fast to build, and which customers get priority when capacity is limited. The effects extend beyond data centers, showing up in system costs, reliability margins, competition for grid access, and pressure on communities and industries that depend on affordable and dependable power. The issue is not whether electricity can be generated, but how the costs and risks of rapid demand growth are distributed as the system tries to keep up. How regulators balance these decisions will determine who pays as AI demand outruns the power grid.

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Scott Nyquist is a senior advisor at McKinsey & Company and vice chairman, Houston Energy Transition Initiative of the Greater Houston Partnership. The views expressed herein are Nyquist's own and not those of McKinsey & Company or of the Greater Houston Partnership. This article originally appeared on LinkedIn.

Texas solar set to overtake coal for first time in 2026, EIA forecasts

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Solar power promises to shine even brighter in Texas this year.

A new forecast from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates that for the first time, annual power generation from utility-scale solar will surpass annual power generation from coal across the territory covered by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).

Solar generation is expected to reach 78 billion kilowatt-hours in 2026 in the ERCOT grid, compared with 60 billion kilowatt-hours for coal, the EIA forecast says. The ERCOT grid supplies power to about 90 percent of Texas, including the Houston area.

“Utility-scale solar generation has been increasing steadily in ERCOT as solar capacity additions help meet rapid electricity demand growth,” the forecast says.

Although natural gas remains the dominant source of electricity generation in ERCOT, accounting for an average 44 percent of electricity generation from 2021 to 2025, solar’s share of the generation mix rose from four percent to 12 percent. During the same period, coal’s share dropped from 19 percent to 13 percent.

EIA predicts about 40 percent of U.S. solar capacity, or 14 billion kilowatt-hours, added in 2026 will come from Texas.

Although EIA expects annual solar generation to exceed annual coal generation in 2026, solar surpassed coal in ERCOT on a monthly basis for the first time in March 2025, when solar generation totaled 4.33 billion kilowatt-hours and coal’s totaled 4.16 billion kilowatt-hours. Solar generation continued to exceed that of coal until August of that year.

“In 2026, we estimate that solar exceeded coal for the first time in March, and we forecast generation from solar installations in ERCOT will continue to exceed that from coal until December, when coal generation exceeds solar,” says EIA. “We expect solar generation to exceed that of coal for every month in 2027 except January and December.”

For 2027, EIA forecasts annual solar generation of 99 billion kilowatt-hours in the ERCOT grid, compared with 66 billion kilowatt-hours of annual coal generation.

In April, ERCOT projected almost 368 billion kilowatt-hours of demand in ERCOT’s territory by 2032. ERCOT’s all-time peak demand hit 85.5 billion kilowatt-hours in August 2023.

“Texas is experiencing exceptional growth and development, which is reshaping how large load demand is identified, verified, and incorporated into long-term planning,” ERCOT President and CEO Pablo Vegas said. “As a result of a changing landscape, we believe this forecast to be higher than expected … load growth.”